This paper demonstrates how expectations about the design of regimes in ‡uence countries' actions before negotiating for agreements on international environmental problems. In the case where a country has private information about its own reduction costs, the pre-agreement emission level might serve as a devise to signal costs. Two main results emerge. The …rst is that private information leads to an environmentally less e¤ective situation. And second, the distortions depend on type of regime. In particular, for high probability of high costs, distortions are lower in a uniform regime than under a di¤erentiated regime. Hence, comparison of regimes is non-trivial when private information is added. C72, D82, F00, Q2.
Introduction
International environmental agreements exist for many transboundary pollution problems. The Montreal Protocol calls for a 50% reduction in CFC emissions by the signatories by 1999 compared to 1987 (with a 10-year lag for developing countries). In 1985 a protocol addresses the long-range transboundary air pollution in Europe committing the 21 signatories to reduce ¤ Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern Denmark, Esbjerg, Niels Bohrs Vej 9-10, 6700 Esbjerg. E-mail: usb@sam.sdu.dk. I am grateful to two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions on a previous version of this paper. sulphur emissions by at least 30% by 1993 as compared to the 1980 emission levels (the "30% club").
1 Finally, the Kyoto-protocol stipulates di¤erentiated reductions by 2008-2012 compared to 1990 for most OECD countries. 2 Large di¤erences in the environmental achievements of the three agreements exist. In particular, the environmental e¤ectiveness of the Montreal protocol is considerably higher what will be achieved in the Kyoto protocol, even if all countries would comply withe the agreed upon targets. Barrett [1997] argue that the main reason for this di¤erences can be attributed to the fact that free riding can be controlled in the …rst, but not in the second treaty. While the free riding aspect has received considerable attention in the literature, the present paper analysis a second source to ine¢ciency stemming from strategically manipulating private information about reduction costs. While free-riding can be attributed to prisoners' dilemma-type of payo¤ structures combined with the nonexistence of an e¤ective supranational enforcement institution, strategic manipulation can be attributed to optimizing agents exploiting their informational advantages under private information about payo¤ relevant parameters. While free riding can be handled if e¤ective punishment mechanisms can be found, strategic manipulations might still prevail.
A common feature of the above mentioned treaties is that the individual countries' reduction obligations are speci…ed relative to speci…c preagreement emission levels. This forms the point of departure of the analysis since this similarity in design is likely to shape expectations that also future treaties will have this type of design. Given such expectation, and if e.g. it is expected that a uniform reduction regime will be agreed upon, being reluctant with national abatement initiatives (compared to a short run optimal choice of emission level), will result in a smaller reduction obligation in future treaties.
The analysis builds on a signalling game approach, where the pre-agreement emission levels serve as signals of costs and is the …rst to analyse informational asymmetries in international environmental problems in such a framework. The main advantage of such a signalling model is its ability to analyse the incentives to distort pre-agreement emissions in situations where countries hold private information about their own reduction costs. By introducing two types of reduction regimes, a uniform and a di¤erentiated regime, the analysis moreover makes it possible to compare the resulting distortions between these two classes of reduction regimes in situations where the countries try to exploit their informational advantages. In both types of reduction regimes, individual reductions are determined as percentage reduction compared to a well-speci…ed pre-agreement emission level. Hence, the inclusion of private information has serious implications on the environmental protection that a given agreement can provide. In the uniform reduction regime, each country is required to reduce by the same percentage compared to its pre-agreement emission, whereas in the di¤erentiated regime, the individual reduction obligations can vary, but still are dependent on the pre-agreement emissions level. The paper shows that the expected emission levels will be higher than under full information in both regimes, the level of distortion, however, depends non-trivially on the type of reduction regime agreed upon.
We do not model the negotiation phase explicitly, but focus on situations where a country expects that being reluctant with pre-agreement emissions will turn out bene…cial in terms of less costly reductions implied by the treaty. By looking at simple bargaining models like the Nash Bargaining solution, such expectations are not unrealistic, since these models imply that higher pre-agreement emissions level (which is equal to the thread point), everything else being equal results in higher emissions level implied by the bargaining model. Hence, given this picture, countries might expect that also future treaties are designed such that being reluctant with pre-agreement emissions will turn out bene…cial since the target emission level implied by the demands of the treaty are higher.
At …rst, when reduction targets are speci…ed relative to a speci…c preagreement emissions level, incentives to increase emissions in order to receive less demanding reduction obligations has seemingly been taken care of: Many international environmental agreements stipulate individual reductions in percentages of emission levels that have been observed well before the treaty is agreed upon. This is, of course, to reduce incentives to in ‡ate actual emissions in order to reduce less once the agreement has been settled. This is, however, not the end of the story since other and more subtle incentives might exist, leaving a lot of room for acting reluctantly with regards to reducing emissions on strategic purposes. A number of international environmental agreements are built-up by successively tightening the individual and total reduction obligations. In the e¤ort to control the climate change problem, the …rst negotiations in Rio in 1992 stipulated stabilization of emissions, whereas the Kyoto agreement stipulated a total 5.2% reduction by 2008-2012 compared to 1990 levels for most industrialized countries. The same successive increase in demands has been identi…ed in the e¤orts to control the European acid rain problem (see Greene, 1996 and Klaassen, 1996) and to control the ozone layer depletion problem (Barrett, 1997) . The strategic incentives arise when there is an expectation that past performance is linked to future demands. Consequently, the build-up of these agreements might very well provide a breeding ground for not engaging in serious reduction e¤orts in the early stages, the result being a downward pressure on individual reductions. 3 An example of this interdependence has been identi…ed by Barrett [1998] . He notes that in connection with a second round that is expected to follow the requirements of the Kyoto-agreement in 2008-2012, a country might be able to negotiate an easier target for the next period if it invested less in reducing its abatement costs in the …rst control period. In OECD [2000] it is argued that future agreements will depend on the initial steps ("path dependency") and expectations that reduction requirements in later periods are positively correlated with reduction e¤orts in earlier periods certainly can emerge. In combination with private information, it is no longer obvious that this can be handled easily, and strategic manipulations might not longer be detectable.
How substantial are these informational problems? There are several reasons to expect that a country is better informed about its cost structure than about the cost structure of the other countries. First of all, information about abatement costs are based on estimates: As the abatement has not yet been undertaken, it might very well be that a country can make its own estimates more precisely than can foreign countries. La¤ont and Boyer [1999] assume that there exist speci…c economic conditions that the government in power is better equipped to observe (from con…dential reports of the public service bureaucracy, for example). Furthermore they assume that the politicians have the discretion of using their private information about the economy. 3 That expectations about precedence matters, is well documented. As a leading example, a main reason why the USA did not approve a fund to support poorer countries in the CFC-issue were worries that this would lead to precedence in the much more expensive climate change issue. See e.g. Benedict [1991] . 4 The fact that a country may act strategically on environmental issues is now well recognized. See e.g. Folmer, et al. [1993] , Bohm [1994] , Ulph [1996 ], Folmer, et al. [1998 , Nannerup [1998] and Brandt and Nannerup [1999] .
Second, it also makes sense to perceive costs as including 'political costs' of meeting a given emission target. If there is strong pressure from industrial groups in a country, and there is a real concern about competitiveness and employment, costs of reduction might prove to be high. On the other hand, in situations where such political costs are not predominant, a government might still use such arguments for not taking su¢cient domestic measures in order to avoid costly international engagement. It is natural to think of such information as being private to the government. Hence, private information about reduction costs is a non-negligible possibility and gives rise for incentives to exploit such informational advantages.
The next section presents the model and the main assumptions. In section 3 the separating and pooling equilibria for the two regimes are derived, while section 4 presents the process of equilibrium selection and the re…nements are applied. The comparison of the two di¤erent regimes is presented in section 5, while section 6 concludes the paper.
The model
The following set-up provides the basis for the analysis: A transboundary pollution problem exists with total emissions, e T = P e i , where i = 1; : : : ; n are the countries involved. Denote by I = f1; : : : ; ng the set of all a¤ected countries. Each country's net bene…t from national and total emissions is
, where B i (e i ) is the bene…t from own emissions and D i (e T ) is the damage induced by total emissions. We make the standard assumption of strictly concave net bene…t functions.
5 Under full information, in a static, non-cooperative situation, a country chooses its emission level, e i = e ¤ i , so as to maximize national bene…ts from emissions, i.e., NB
Denote by c i (e i ) the cost for country i from deviating from e ¤ i , and assume that c i is strictly convex in e i .Formally, let c i (e i ) = NB i (e ¤ i ; e T ¤ )¡NB i (e i ; e T ); where e T ¤ = P e ¤ j . Since NB i is assumed strict concave, c i (e i ) is strict convex.
6 Now assume two types of countries, a high cost type and a low 5 See e.g. Finus (2000) for a thorough discussion of this assumption. 6 For most international environmental problems, countries are equipped with negatively sloped reaction curves (see i.e. Finus, 2001) . As already discussed in the introduction, the strategic considerations for the countries are to increase emissions above the non-cooperative level, in order to receive less reductions. Given the negatively sloped reactions functions, the response of the other countries will be to decrease their emissions. Everything else being equal, this implies that the total emissions implied by a treaty will cost type. The high cost type (H-type) can be thought of as having high costs of changing emission away from its optimal level, while the low cost type (L-type) has low costs of doing so. Let c(e i ; µ) be the country's cost of achieving a given emission target when it is of type µ = fL; Hg. For notational simplicity, we omit the country subscript and de…ne e ¤ µ as the non-cooperative level of emissions from a country of type µ. …nally, it is assumed that e
Note that since the incentives to distort pre-agreement emission levels are triggered solely by the countries' expectation about the design of future agreements an explicitly model of the negotiation process is not needed. Since this paper is the …rst to analysis the importance of information asymmetries on the pre-agreement emissions level, we make the simplifying assumption that a country expects that percentage reduction level it receives is independent of its pre-agreement emission level. However, it is not unreasonable to assume such expectations. If a country expects a uniform reduction regime with reductions compared to emissions at a speci…c pre-agreement date, this is obvious the case. On the other hand, if it expects a di¤erentiated regime, it must have formed expectations that there will be a positive relationship between emissions level prior to an agreement and the emissions target implied by the agreement. Support for such expectations can be found by resorting to predictions of theoretical bargaining models like the Nash bargaining solution.
7 If a country expects that the reductions are determined on basis of the Nash Bargaining solution, (where the non-cooperative situation is taken as the thread-point) then a country by in ‡ating its pre-agreement emissions level will have a smaller emission target implied by the agreement.
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On the other hand, it is not obvious that a country simply by claiming that it has high costs can expect to get special treatment. If we consider an agreement as a consensus instrument as done by e.g. Chayes and Chayes (1995) and Young (1989) , then under private information, a country must somehow be able to convince the other countries that it is has higher costs in be reduced. We do not investigate this issue further, but fell that the whole discussion about how countries respond on other countries' strategic behavior surely deserves more attention.
7 See e.g. Friedman (1986) and Folmer and Hanley (1998) for a discussion of the Nash bargaining solution with respect to environmental agreements. 8 The same type of incentives arise if a country (or a …rm) expects that a tradable permit system will be initiated where the permit are grandfathered on basis of historic emission levels.
order for the other countries to accept that it should have a lower reduction target. This is in essence the point of departure of this analysis.
Assume that there exists two stages, one stage containing all actions prior to the negotiations, denoted as period 1, that contains all the strategic behavior, and the agreement stage, period 2, where countries comply with their reduction obligations. Period 1 could be thought of as being any stage in the build-up of an e¤ective agreement, including the case of no existing agreement.
Before the negotiations take place each country obtains complete and perfect information about its own reduction costs, whereas it remains uninformed about the costs of other countries. Instead, all other countries hold a prior probability assessment about the value of µ. Let ½ o be the prior beliefs that costs are high, with ½ o < 1. This is common knowledge. After observing e, the others update their prior ½ o to posterior belief, ½(e), using Bayes rule (if possible). Let R : ½(e) ! < + be a function mapping posterior beliefs into second period emission target levels.
Next, let us formalize the reduction obligations. De…ne a percentage reduction as follows. Let ® 2 [0; 1] be the …xed percentage reduction compared to the full information pre-agreement emission level. In a uniform reduction regime, ® i = ® j ; 8i; j 2 I: That is, each country in the uniform reduction regime reduces by the same percentage compared to its emission level before the treaty is agreed upon. It is natural to call this type of uniform reductions, a relative uniform reduction, since in absolute terms, the reductions of any two countries, i and j, will di¤er, when their baseline emissions di¤er. In this way it takes into account that, e.g., cost di¤erences have moved otherwise symmetric countries onto di¤erent emission-paths, although their percentage reductions are equal. For analytical purposes, however, this set-up is transformed as follows: Let e
H be the second period emissions level implied be the treaty. There are now two emission requirements, depending on whether costs are perceived to be high or low.
Next, lets formalize the two di¤erent reduction regimes: In regime 1, there are only two responses. Formally, in regime 1,
That is, R is a step function mapping the posterior beliefs into two elements. In regime 2, R is monotonic and strictly increasing in ½:
Here, any reduction requirement in the interval (® L ; ® H ) is possible. A strategy for a country is a mapping from the set of types into the set of emission levels. A strategy, e µ , speci…es an emission level for each possible type. Hence, e µ = (e L ; e H ). Assume that all countries behave consistently, i.e., make use of Bayes Rule. Since µ is unknown, µ must be deduced from the observation of e ¤ µ . Since R is monotonic in ½(e), and the second period reduction is totally determined by the …rst period choice of emission level, e, second period costs can be written as c = c(µ; ½(e)). Total costs are, by assuming no discounting, given by C = C(µ; e; ½(e)) = c(e; µ) + c(µ; ½(e)). Let e(µ,½) be the unique minimizer of C(¢). For a given ½, we have that e(µ; ½) = argminC(µ; e; ½(e)).
To get more structure on incentives, the following standard assumptions on C are made: A1: C(µ; e; ½) is continuous and strictly convex in e with full information minimizer e(L; 0) for the low cost type and e(H; 1) for the high cost type, respectively.
A2: C(µ; e; ½) is strictly decreasing in ½, with C(L; e; ½)<C(H; e; ½) for all e and ½ 2 [0; 1].
A3: C(L; e(H; 1); 1) < C(L; e(L; 0); 0).
A4a: C(L; e 0 ; ½) ¡ C(L; e 00 ; ½)¸C(H; e 0 ; ½) ¡ C(H; e 00 ; ½) for all e 0 > e 00 .
A4b: C(L; e 0 ; 1) ¡ C(L; e(L; 0); 0)¸C(H; e 0 ; 1) ¡ C(H; e(H; 1); 0), for all e 0¸e (H; 1).
A1 is a standard regularity condition. It ensures that a unique minimizer for C exists for all (e; ½) pairs. The …rst part of A2 says that both types prefer as high a ½ as possible, while the second part of A2 says that each (e; ½) pair gives less cost to the low cost type than to the high cost type. A3 is an assumption to make things interesting. It indicates that the high cost type must take a costly action in order to separate. Given A2, incentives are clear: Each type wants as high a ½ as possible, and the way it can in ‡uence the updating of ½ is through its choice of e. If, e.g., the low cost type can convince the other countries that it has high costs by mimicking the choice of the high cost type, it might get a more favorable updating. A4a is a single crossing condition stating that costs of increasing emissions are no less for the low cost type than for the high cost type. A4b captures what is su¢cient in our model to get a separating equilibrium outcome. It states that increasing emissions above e(H; 1), if followed by most favorable beliefs, is more costly for the low cost type than for the high cost type, compared to choosing their respective …rst-best emission levels followed by the worst possible beliefs. Since e(H; 1) > e(L; 0), this is a reasonable assumption.
Sequential equilibria
Throughout the analysis attention is restricted to pure strategy equilibria. In this case there are two di¤erent kinds of equilibria; separating equilibria, where each type sends di¤erent signals, and pooling equilibria where the two types send the same signal. In a separating equilibrium, the receiver can perfectly infer the type of the sender, while in a pooling equilibrium, no new information is revealed. Formally, a collection fê L ;ê H ;1(e)g forms a sequential equilibrium if the following conditions are satis…ed: i) Optimally for the country with costs µ: e µ 2 argmin C(e;1(e); µ).
By observingê L , it is known that costs are low, and accordingly, the emission level e t L is assigned to the country. In the same fashion, by observinĝ e H , it is known that costs are high and is assigned e t H . In the case of pooling, no new information is revealed, and, given the requirement of Bayesian consistency, the posterior belief is equal to the prior belief. In regime 1, e P 2 fe In regime 2 the assigned emission level is assumed to be a convex combination of the two emission levels,
9 Hence, any response in the range between e t L and e t H is possible. In this particular signalling game the requirement of consistency of beliefs does not place any restriction on beliefs following an out-of-equilibrium signal, i.e., any beliefs are admissible if an out-of-equilibrium outcome is observed.
In a separating equilibrium, the high type succeeds in separating from the low type, and is accordingly perfectly recognized as a high type, while the low type is revealed as a low type. 10 In order to fully describe the set of possible separating equilibrium outcomes, we assume that out-of-equilibrium signals are followed by the most unfavorable beliefs seen from the sender's point of view, ½(e) = 0 if e µ 6 = fê L ;ê H g. Given these beliefs, a su¢cient 9 The linearity is assumed for convenience only. Any monotonic function, e P = e(½ o ) where e P = e t H for ½ o = 1 and e P = e t L for ½ o = 0 could be used. 10 No distinction is made between the two regimes in our analysis of separating equilibria, since the results are equivalent.
condition for a strategy pair to form a separating equilibrium is that:
C(H; e(H; 1); 0)¸C(H;ê H ; 1)
It is convenient to de…ne the two sets S H = fe ¤ jC(H; e(H; 1); 0)Ç (H; e ¤ ; 1)g and S L = fe ¤ jC(L; e(L; 0); 0) · C(L; e ¤ ; 1)g, where S H and S L are the sets of emissions satisfying 3.1 and 3.2, respectively, the set of separating equilibrium outcomes is de…ned asê L = e(L; 0), andê H 2 S L \ S H (whereê H > e(H; 1)).
Theorem 1:
Given A1-A4, there exist sequential separating equilibria.
Proof, see appendix 1.
The set of separating equilibrium outcomes is generally large, as an example presented in …gure 1 demonstrates.
Here, the following notation is applied: ē µ = minargfC(µ; e(µ; 0); 0) = C(µ; e; 1)g and ¹ e µ = maxargfC(µ; e(q; 0); 0) = C(µ; e; 1)g. This implies that:
- Figure 1 here-S H is the set of emission levels that makes it preferable for the high cost type type to separate. By separating, the high cost type receives a better response (as ½ increases from 0 to 1). Graphically, this is represented by a movement from the upper curve denoted C(H; e; 0) to the lower curve C(H; e; 1), implying lower costs from providing the same emission level in period 1. Because distorting e away from e(H; 1) is increasingly costly, ē H and ¹ e H de…nes the lower the upper bounds, respectively, on the emission level where the better response outweighs the increased cost from this distortion. S L is the set of emission levels that does not make it preferable for the low cost type to separate. By separating, the low cost types moves graphically from the upper cost curve C(L; e; 0) to the lower curve C(L; e; 1). It is not pro…table for the low cost type to separate when the emission level is increased or decreased su¢ciently compared to e(L; 0). ē L and ¹ e L de…ne the lower and upper bounds, respectively. As long as ¹ e L < ¹ e H , which is guaranteed by A4b, separating equilibria exists, indicated by the bold line in …gure 1.
In a pooling equilibrium each type sent the same signal, and no new information is conveyed to the uninformed player. De…neê p as a pooling equilibrium outcome. In pooling equilibrium,
p then ½(e) = 0. Out-of-equilibrium beliefs are such that all sequential pooling equilibrium outcomes are captured. Lets consider the pooling equilibria in the two regimes. Recall, that in regime 1,
be an exogenous given threshold probability with the property that if
The interpretation is that only if it is su¢ciently likely that a country has high costs, it will receive the weaker reduction obligation e t H . Pooling equilibria exist for ½ o > ¹ ½ and have the property that they all give rise to the most favorable response. The condition thatê p forms a pooling equilibrium is therefore:
In regime 2, the di¤erentiated regime, givenê p is observed, means the country's reduction obligation amounts to
.ê p forms a pooling equilibrium if it satis…es:
These two conditions give rise to a smaller set of pooling equilibrium outcomes than does 3.3 and 3.4, because the LHS of 3.5 and 3.6 is higher (½ = ½ o compared to ½ = 1 in 3.3 and 3.4). A closer look at the conditions, focussing on regime 2, highlights the basic trade-o¤ that the two types face in a pooling equilibrium. The high cost type can either signalê p , thereby no new information is revealed. Accordingly, other countries use their prior belief as the basis for the reduction requirement. On the other hand, if the high cost type uses any other emission level, it will be regarded as an e¢cient type and the more severe reduction requirement will be imposed. Therefore, it might as well use e(H; 1) since this minimizes …rst-period costs. The same reasoning covers the basic choice of the low cost type. Now de…ne the sets P H = fe ¤ jC(H; e ¤ ; ½ o ) · C(H; e(H; 1); 0)g and
e(L; 0); 0)g. P H and P L are the sets of emissions satisfying 3.5 and 3.6, respectively. Forê p to be a pooling equilibrium outcome, 3.5 and 3.6 must hold for both types, which is given bŷ e p = P H \ P L .
- Figure 2 about hereIn …gure 2, a possible set of pooling equilibrium outcomes are depicted. Here we have that:
. Note that P L lies around e(L; 0). In any pooling equilibrium in regime 2, the response is given by ½ o implied by the cost curve C(L; e; ½ o ). Note further that the only optimal deviation from a pooling equilibrium is to play e(L; 0). ē P L and ¹ e P L de…ne the lower and the upper bounds of the interval where it is not optimal to deviate to e(L; 0) from a pooling equilibrium. The same reasoning can be applied to P H , which enables us to state the existence of sequential pooling equilibrium outcomes in both regimes:
Theorem 2:
A Sequential pooling equilibrium outcomes exists in both regimes for su¢ciently high ½ o .
Equilibrium selection
Equilibrium re…nements used for signalling games are based on the notion of forward induction, which asserts that when truly rational players enter a game then they, in evaluating strategies, should also reason from the beginning of the game-tree by using introspection, i.e., by examining who has an incentive to send possible out-of-equilibrium messages, and then revise their beliefs accordingly. Given that it is common knowledge among the players that everyone engages in this introspection process, an implicit communication emerges. To see how these re…nements work, let us imagine the process of introspection of the players. The idea is that a player picks a candidate equilibrium outcome and then reviews the beliefs on out-of-equilibrium information sets that sustain this outcome. Then the players apply a criterion that describes what constitutes a reasonable belief. If, by taking into account the reasonableness of these beliefs and believing that the other players also do so, at least one player has an incentive to deviate, then this outcome is no longer an equilibrium outcome in the re…ned game.
The equilibrium re…nement techniques employed are to eliminate weakly dominated strategies and to eliminate equilibrium dominated strategies. A strategy e' is weakly dominated by e" for type µ, if the costs of sending e' are always higher than sending e" even under the worst circumstances, i.e., if min ½ C(µ; e'; ½)¸max ½ C(µ; e"; ½) , C(µ; e'; 1)¸C(µ; e"; 0). Equilibrium dominated strategies are de…ned as follows. Fix a given sequential equilibriumê. The signal e' is equilibrium dominated for type µ, if µ's total cost in equilibrium C ¤ (µ;ê; ½) is smaller than µ's smallest possible total net cost from sending e': C ¤ (µ;ê; ½) < min ½ [C(q; e'; ½)] = C(q; e'; 0).
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The …rst requirement on belief formation is that, if a signal e' is weakly dominated for one type µ, but not for the other type, the uninformed players' beliefs should place zero probability that µ has sent e', i.e., ½(µje') = 0. The second, and stronger requirement, that of equilibrium domination, which also is called the intuitive criterion, is de…ned as follows: If a signal e' is equilibrium dominated for type µ but not for the other type, the uninformed player's belief should place zero probability that µ has sent e', i.e. ½(µje') = 0. Sequential equilibria that survive application of this intuitive criterion, are denoted intuitive sequential equilibria. This leads to the following elimination procedure. First eliminate all weakly dominated strategy. If more than one equilibrium survives, then eliminate all equilibrium dominated strategies: With these de…nitions in place, we have the next result:
Theorem 3: a) In both regimes, only one undominated separating equilibrium exists,
b) In regime 1, the intuitive pooling equilibrium outcomes will exist for ½ o > ¹ ½. The set of intuitive pooling equilibrium outcomes is given byê p 2
[e(H; 1);ê H ], while in regime 2, no intuitive pooling equilibrium outcome exists.
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Looking …rst at a), note that all e 2 S L are weakly dominated by e(L; 0) for the low cost type, while no e 2 S H is weakly dominated for the high cost type. Moreover, ¹ e L is the lowest emission level in the set of separating equilibrium outcomes. This seems intuitive, since the high cost type uses least costly actions in order to separate from the shadow of the low cost type. Turn now to the set of pooling equilibrium outcomes and consider whether we can reduce the set or even eliminate all the sequential pooling equilibrium outcomes. The reason why we cannot exclude all the pooling equilibrium in regime 1 is that beliefs are already most favorable in the pooling equilibrium, and, hence, no gains in terms of better updating in the second period can be achieved by deviating.
13 This is in contrast to the continuum response case, where second period gain is possible, and there always exists an outof-equilibrium signal that is equilibrium dominated for the low type, but not for the high type.
Results
In order to compare the cost and environmental distortions in the two regimes, we will only compare the Pareto-e¢cient intuitive pooling equilibrium (PIPE) outcome with the undominated separating equilibrium (USE) outcome, assuming throughout that ½ o is su¢ciently high such that pooling equilibrium outcomes exist. Note that the two regimes do not di¤er under full information. Hence, we can use the full information case as a benchmark to calculate which regime results in the most distortion. First, we demonstrate when a unique focal outcome exists in regime 1. We will do this in steps to reveal important insights. First, it is easy to demonstrate thatê p = e(H; 1) Pareto dominates all other intuitive pooling equilibria, in the sense that it yields the lowest expected costs and lowest expected emissions. Now there are two 12 Some minor additional assumptions are needed in order to establish result b. See Appendix.
13 When both types are in the intervalê 2 [e(H; 1);ê H ] increasing e, increases …rst period costs, but gain nothing in the second period, all these out-of-equilibrium signals are equilibrium dominated for both types and the intuitive criteria has no bite at all.
candidates for a unique prediction, the PIPE and the USE outcomes. Lets …rst make the comparison with regards to costs:
Costs are always higher in USE than in PIPE given A3.
While it is obviously true for the high cost type, since PIPE is equal to its full information choice, for the low cost type, A3 states that the L-type prefers e(H; 1) if it is followed by ½ = 1, compared to e(L; 0) followed by ½ = 0, but these are exactly the two situations we compare.
Until now, considerations about the expected emission levels in the two regimes have been left out. Now, let ½ o be interpreted as the fraction of countries that have high costs, and assume that the lower the total emissions, the better for a country. Comparison of emission levels between the two regimes reveals where distortions are highest.
Lemma 2:
For ½ o >1; expected emissions are higher in USE than in PIPE.
The intuition of lemma 2 is that the higher ½ o , the higher the expected emissions in the separating equilibrium outcome in the …rst period, while in the pooling equilibrium outcome, the expected emission level is una¤ected by the level of ½ o . In the second period the expected emission is the same in both types of equilibria. Although the emission level might be lower in the pooling equilibrium, it will always be larger than compared to the full information case, because the second period expected emission is the same, while …rst period emission is always higher. In particular, the value of the RHS depends onê H . The higher the e¤ort in terms of increased emissions necessary in order to get separation, the higher will be the overall emissions in such a separating equilibrium compared to the emissions in the uniform regime, and the smaller is the ½ o necessary to make the uniform (pooling) have less emissions. By arguing along the same lines as Bagwell and Ramey [1988] , that, if both types would gain from choosing a particular equilibrium, then the other countries should expect them to do so, and the implication of lemma 1 and 2 is:
For ½¸1, the unique prediction is in regime 1, the PIPE and in regime 2, the USE, respectively.
The lack of ‡exibility of the uniform approaches results in a tendency towards pooling. This is in accordance with common sense. The higher the ‡exibility of the proposed instrument, the larger the ability to separate types. When there is no ‡exibility, everyone has simply to be treated equally (which might be the reason why uniform reductions have been so popular).
Note that for su¢ciently high ½ o , emissions are lower in the PIPE than in the USE for the high cost type. At the same time the costs for this type are always lower in the PIPE than in the USE. The main …ndings, with reference to the comparison of the two regimes, are derived from lemmas 1-3, and summarized in the following proposition:
For ½¸1, costs are lower for the high cost types and total expected emissions are higher in the USE than in PIPE.
The intuition here is that the higher ½ o , the higher the expected emissions in the separating equilibrium outcomes in the …rst period, while in the pooling equilibrium outcome, the expected emission level is una¤ected by the level of ½ o . In the second period the expected emission is the same in both types of equilibria. Because the second period expected emissions are the same, while …rst period emissions are always higher, costs will always be larger than compared to the full information case, even though the total emissions level might be lower in the pooling equilibrium. Proposition 1 the condition under which the uniform reduction regime yields additional reductions at lower costs than the di¤erentiated regime. The main hypothesis made by economists, that di¤erentiated approaches are superior to uniform approaches appears not to be robust for all informational assumptions. Under private information, the higher ‡exibility of the di¤erentiated regime brings about full revelation. Yet, as already noted by Bagwell and Ramey [1988] , this fully revealing equilibrium might be Pareto dominated by a pooling equilibrium. We have also shown that the resulting environmental quality might be worsening in such an equilibrium compared to the pooling equilibrium. The interpretation of the two di¤erent response sets, as being a uniform and a di¤erentiated reduction regime, respectively, might seem crucial. On the other hand, recall that the di¤erentiated approaches are more ‡exible, and that ‡exibility is the main reason why these approaches have been shown to exhibit their superiority. It is precisely the ‡exibility content of di¤erentiated approaches that makes them more sensitive to informational limitations in this analysis than uniform approaches
The most important lesson is that private information has an asymmetric impact on the distortions in the two regimes. This result shows that the tendency to focus on uniform reductions can be determined in an asymmetric information model on the basis of the magnitude of ½ o . From a political perspective, if we accept the Pareto-e¢cient intuitive pooling equilibrium outcome as a focal point in regime 2, the conclusion is, that when designing an agreement, and in particular, when deciding on the type of the response set, the strategic implications of a certain design should not be neglected.
Finally, let us …rst provide a general picture of the signi…cance of introducing private information.
Proposition 2:
In both regimes, the emission levels are distorted upwards by introducing private information. This is obvious for the separating equilibrium. The only di¤erence is that the high cost type increases its emission level above its full information level. In the pooling equilibrium outcome, the …rst period emission levels are higher, while second period emissions level depend on the value of ½ o . It can, however, easily be shown that in the Pareto-e¢cient intuitive pooling equilibrium, expected emissions are always higher than in full information by an amount of (1 ¡ ½ o )(e(H; 1) ¡ e(L; 0)).
The presence of private information and the way reductions are speci…ed taken together have a negative e¤ect of the environmental e¤ectiveness of a reduction proposal. This result is una¤ected by the value of ½ o . Hence, as already demonstrated in the comparison of the two reduction regimes, private information has to be taken seriously in the design of agreements.
Conclusion
As noted by, e.g., Tirole [1993], Folmer et. al. [1998] , Toman [1998] , and Boyer and La¤ont [1999] , a whole new research area has emerged: Optimal choice of environmental policies in a second best world under informational, political and institutional constraints. This current paper is in line with this new approach and demonstrates the necessity of this research: The common sense results under full information might not carry over to private information situations, or at least they may have to be modi…ed. The …rst important lesson this paper tells is that no instrument (or regime) is superior in all circumstances, contradicting common sense arguments. Another important lesson is that expectations about design can have an e¤ect on the actions of the countries before the negotiations takes place and since there is obviously an interdependence between the di¤erent stages necessary to reach an agreement, this also a¤ects the path of the negotiations.
From the analysis in this paper a number of interesting issues emerges. First, lets elaborate on the choice of instrument and the possibility to reveal information. Since the negotiations are voluntarily, the choice of instrument is also endogenous. Until now, the choice of regime has been taken as exogenous. Is it possible to infer anything about how the presence of private information a¤ects the choice in instrument? When ½ o is high, a majority of countries prefer the uniform solution. The reason for this, as seen above, is that when a country has high costs, it has to make much e¤ort to get separated. The more high cost types, the more that emissions will be distorted upward in a di¤erentiated regime, giving more damage and more costs compared to a uniform regime. Although the outcome of a negotiation is not directly determined by majority voting, bargaining might very well be a¤ected by the fact that a majority favours a speci…c solution.
A number of papers show that uniform solutions have desirable properties in a second-best world. Eyckmans [1999] , Brandt [2001] and Finus [2001] show in di¤erent settings, that the least common denominator uniform solution has the nice property that 'truth telling' is a dominant strategy. Hence, such a solution eliminates informational distortions, but it comes with a price: The resulting reductions might turn out to be very low. The same focus on the uniform reduction regime can result in the applied model of the current paper. Another proposal has been put forward by Carraro and Siniscalco [1993] : Under private information an information revealing mechanism can be employed by use of an appropriate information of self-selection premium. In our paper, this is nothing more than …nding a direct mechanism where the premium is the necessary payment to get separation. Two reservations on this proposal should be noted, however, one is that this complicates the agreement signi…cantly, and the other is that such payments are rarely observed (or feasible).
14 The general impression is that truthful revelation always comes at a price, either the overall reductions must be lowered, or the complexity, and hence, the practical use, is decreased.
Finally, the connection between free rider incentives and the inclusion of private information also deserves attention: As already noted in the introduction, if free riding cannot be handled, it will undermine any e¤ort to e¤ectively deal with the international environmental problem. We can link the incentives here with the free-riding incentives in the following way: Keeping the prospects of deterring free riding exogenous, it is possible to state that the more there is to gain from participating, the less incentives there are to free-ride: When strategic manipulation reduces the burden for the countries, the less severe are the free-riding incentives. Take, e.g., the separating equilibrium and compare it to full information. For the low cost countries, costs are unchanged, but using proposition 2, overall emissions are lower; hence, low cost countries would prefer full information. For the high cost countries, …rst period costs are higher, while second period costs are the same. In this case, both types are worse o¤ in terms of costs under private information, and hence, free riding incentives are likely to be increased.
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This paper also point to areas for further research. Clearly, prior to the negotiations there are several channels through which a country might improve its position. Under private information, using the informational advantage as analysed in this paper de…nes one such channel. More generally, in order for a country to decide on choice of actions prior to entering a nego-tiation, it must balance the potential of each incentive with the expectation about how acting on this inventive (negatively) a¤ects the prospect of the negotiation. (e.g. in terms of likelihood of a breakdown). With this in mind, free riding might be a less tempting option than the incentives analyzed in this paper, since although the short run bene…t is large, the resulting adverse e¤ect could easily turn out to be large as well. The potential of various incentives analyzed in this way is still an open problem in the literature, but clearly deserves more attention, as does the joint analysis of free riding and incentives arising from private information.
Taking the negative e¤ects from informational shortcomings into account, better designs are possible and preferable. How does this …t with the reality of the most di¢cult and most complicated international environmental problem to date the climate change issue? The recent agreement on climate change in Kyoto does not give any hope that expectations will change. On the contrary, e.g., economies in transition have been given free choices between several base line years, while the other countries have been given a …xed baseline year (1990) . The choices of baselines are, according to Barrett [1998] , motivated by necessary political compromises. This might be an optimal short run strategy, but in the longer run might very well undermine further progress on this and other related environmental problems.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1:
Take an e O > e(H; 1) such that C(H; e O ; 1)¡ C(L; e(H; 1); 0) = 0. Given A1 and A2, such an e O always exists. Next use A4b evaluated at e O : C(L; e O ; 1) ¡ C(L; e(L; 0); 0)¸C(H; e O ; 1)¡ C(H; e(H; 1); 0). The RHS is equal to zero at e O and C(L; e O ; 1)¸C(L; e(L; 0); 0). Hence, given A4b, there exists an e > e(H; 1) that satis…es 3.1 and 3.2.
QED.

Proof of Theorem 2:
Note …rst that if a pooling equilibrium exists in regime 2, then existence is also guaranteed in regime 1.We will show thatê p = e(H; 1) always satis…es 3.5 and 3.6 given su¢ciently high ½ o . Firstê p = e(H; 1) trivially satis…es 3.5 since C(H; e(H; 1); ½ o ) · C(H; e(H; 1); 0) as C is decreasing in ½. Next, evaluate 3.5 at e(H; 1): C(L; e(H; 1); ½ o ) · C(L; e(L; 0); 0). Now use A3, and since C is continuous in ½, for a slight decrease in ½ below 1, A3 will still hold with weak inequality, which is simply the above expression.
QED.
Proof of Theorem 3:
Part a: Weak domination in this case corresponds to the following inequality: C(µ;ê; 1) > C(µ; e(L; 0); 0). First we will show that allê are weakly dominated for the low cost type by e(L; 0). But since allê are separating equilibria, they must satisfy condition 3.1: C(L; e(L; 0); 0)Ç (L;ê; 1), so allê are indeed weakly dominated by e(L; 0) for type L.
Next we have to show that there exists noê H 6 = ¹ e L that is equilibrium dominated by e(H; 1) for the high cost type. I.e., this corresponds to showing that C(H; e(H; 1); 0) > C(H;ê H ; 1). Using condition 3.1 that C(H; e(H; 1); 0)¸C(H;ê H ; 1) and the fact that C(µ; e; 1) is increasing in e for e > e(H; 1) gives us this result that noê H 6 = ¹ e L is weakly dominated by e(H; 1). Therefore, given anê > ¹ e L , if the countries observes an e =ê ¡ ", posterior beliefs will be updated to ½(e) = 1 and consequentlyê is no longer a sequential equilibrium. Onlyê · ¹ e L is undominated.
Next, let us look at part b. In order to prove it, lets …rst derive the following result stated in lemma a: If an out-of-equilibrium signal e'> e(H; 1) exists that is equilibrium dominated for the low cost type but not for the high cost type by e p , then e p cannot be an intuitive pooling equilibrium. To prove this, note that if an e' exists such thatê P is equilibrium dominated for the low cost type, but not for the high cost type, then posterior beliefs following e' will be ½(e') = 1. As e' is not equilibrium dominated for the high cost type, we have that C(H;ê p ; ½ 0 ) > C(H; e'; 1), and therefore, given the favorable updating, the high cost type would prefer e' toê p .
We are now able to state the result that in regime 2, no pooling equilibrium outcome survives the application of the intuitive criteria: Fix a pooling equilibriaê p with beliefs ½(e p ) = ½ o . As C(L;ê If the condition that C(H; e; ½) ¡C(L; e; ½) is non-increasing in ½ o holds, it gives us the weak inequality and A4a, the strong equality. Note that A4a is only de…ned for e > e(H; 1), but e ¤ ; as de…ned, has to be larger than e(H; 1) in order not to be equilibrium dominated for the high cost type. Therefore an e'= e ¤ + " exists that makesê p equilibrium dominated for the low cost type but not for the high cost type, and using lemma a, completes the proof.
Finally, let us look at regime 1. Here we need another assumption A5: For all e 1 ; e 2 2 [ē; ¹ e] , let C(L; e 1 ; 1) ¡ C(L; e 2 ; 1) > C(H; e 1 ; 1) ¡ C(H; e 2 ; 1), where e 2 > e(L; 1) > e 1 , ē = minargfC(L; e(L; 0); 0) = C(L; e; 1)g and ¹ e = maxargfC(L; e(L; 0); 0) = C(L; e; 1)g. This assumption states that in the interval, an equal increase in the emission is more costly for the low cost type than for the high cost type. Because of the convexity of C and the fact that e(H; 1) > e(L; 1) this is likely to be the case in the given interval.
First look atê
p <ē andê p > ¹ e. These cannot be intuitive pooling equilibria outcomes as the low cost type clearly would deviate because for all suchê p we have that C(L;ê p ; 1) > C(L; e(L; 0); 0). Next, …x an equilibriumê p 2 (ē; e(L; 1)). from A5, there exists a unique e o 2 [ē; e(L; 1)] with the following property: C(L;ê; 1) = C(L; e o ; 1) and C(H;ê; 1) < C(H; e o ; 1). . Both C(L; e; 1) and C(H; e; 1) are strictly increasing in e. In addition, forê = e(H; 1), then any e 6 =ê p is equilibrium dominated for type H. Hence, specifying ½(ẽ) = 0 for allẽ <ê p and ½(ẽ) = 1 for allẽ >ê satis…es intuitiveness and all e 2 [e(H; 1);ê H ] are intuitive pooling equilibrium outcomes.
QED.
Proof of lemma 1:
Note …rst that for the high cost type, expected costs are always higher in the USE than in the PIPE, sinceê H > e(H; 1). Now look at the low cost type: The emissions in USE are: e(L; 0) + e t L and in PIPE: e(H; 1) + e t H . Hence expected costs are higher in USE for the low cost type when C(L;ê L ; 0) > C(L; e(H; 1); 1). But this condition is A3.
QED.
Proof of lemma 2:
The expected emissions in USE are: , the expected emissions are higher in USE. Note that1 < 1, sinceê H > e(H; 1) via A3.
QED. 
